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A ROADMAP THROUGH MALICE, ACTUAL OR
IMPLIED: PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORTS
ARISING OUT OF CONTRACT IN MARYLAND
Gary I. Strausbergt
The distinction between tort and tort arising out of contract is
becoming blurred where awards ofpunitive damages are sought.
The article anayzes torts arising out of contract and the present
approach of the Maryland courts to malice, the key element
governing the recovery of punitive damages. The author sug-
gests that the conduct, and not the technical term of the wrong-
ful act, should dictate whether a plaintff may recover punitive
damages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to recover punitive damages against a tortfeasor for his
aggravated tortious conduct has long been recognized.' Equally well
established is that punitive damages are prohibited in pure actions for
breach of contract.2 Between these two extremes lies the hybrid of torts
arising out of contract, for which punitive damages may be recovered
in certain circumstances.' A tort arises out of a contract when the act
of breaching an agreement gives rise to a separate cause of action in
tort. To obtain punitive damages for these torts, however, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's conduct was motivated by hatred or a
deliberate desire to injure the plaintiff.4
Because of the elusive nature of this hybrid, Maryland's courts
have repeatedly attempted to define the circumstances under which pu-
nitive damages may be recovered when a tort arises out of a contract.5
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1. See Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307-09 (1884); D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-14 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 44, 338 A.2d 48, 52-53 (1975);
Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 313, 297 A.2d 758, 760 (1972); St.
Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 236-37, 278
A.2d 12, 33-34, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 1077, at 438 (1964); D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.4, at 818; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 comment a (1981).
3. Obvious examples of this cause of action are conversion, tortious interference with
contract, and fraud accompanying a breach of contract. See infra notes 39-60 and
accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the malice requirement, see infra notes 64-81 and accompany-
ing text.
5. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977);
Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); Henderson v.
Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976); Food Fair Stores v. Hevey,
The cases have left a complicated set of rules and exceptions in their
wake. This article will examine these decisions and the distinctions be-
tween the availability of punitive damages for torts, breaches of con-
tracts, and torts arising out of contract to show the erosion of the
boundaries and justifications for these conceptual subdivisions. Based
on this analysis, the article concludes with a proposal that Maryland
adopt a uniform standard to govern the award of punitive damages in
all cases.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE TRADITIONAL RULES
Although this commentary focuses primarily on Maryland appel-
late decisions, the development of punitive damages cannot be under-
stood without exploring its origins. It is therefore necessary to trace the
historical source of the reasoning behind the availability of punitive
damages in tort actions and their non-availability in contract suits.
A. Origin of Punitive Damages-The Genesis of the Dichotomy
The concept of punitive damages was developed in early England6
as a means of justifying large jury verdicts.7 Because juries were wit-
nessing bodies, composed of citizens who were often personally famil-
iar with the facts of a given dispute, early appellate tribunals were
reluctant to review jury verdicts.8 The judiciary would grant a new
275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338
A.2d 48 (1975); National Micrographics Sys. v. Oce-Indus., 55 Md. App. 526, 465
A.2d 862 (1983); Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, 44 Md. App. 610, 411
A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 287 Md. 749 (1980).
6. The earliest English punitive damages provision was the Statute of Westminster I,
3 Edw. 1 Ch. 1 (1275) (double damages for trespass against religious persons).
For a discussion of the historical evolution under the Code of Hammurabi, Baby-
lonian law, the Hebrew Code of Mosaic Law, Roman law, the Hindu Code of
Manu, and ancient Greek writings, see Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History,
Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1980); Comment, Punitive Damages in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The
Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 771-72 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B. 1764); Huckle v.
Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). For a discussion of the historical develop-
ment in England, see Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Re-
ality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 213 (1977); Note,
Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518-20 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Exemplary Damages]. Other commentators have ad-
vanced the theory that large jury verdicts were explained as a way to compensate
the plaintiff for those damages that, at the time, were not legally compensable.
MALLOR & ROBERTS, Punitive Damages: Toward a Privileged Approach, 31 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 639, 643 (1980); Note, Exemplary Damages, supra, at 520 n.23.
8. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 209-10 n.15; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF DAMAGES § 6, at 24-25 (1935); Washington, Damages in Contract at Com-
mon Law, 47 LAW Q. REV. 345, 346-47 (1931); Zane, The Attaint, 15 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1916). The earliest procedure used to review excessive jury verdicts
was the writ of attaint, which involved the impaneling of 24 knights to review the
case. For a thorough discussion of this procedure, see Sullivan, supra note 7, at
210-11; Washington, supra, at 346-51; Zane, supra, at 1-20, 127-48.
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trial only when it could objectively assess the true measure of the dam-
ages.9 In tort actions this measure was often difficult to assess.' ° Ac-
cordingly, large tort verdicts were frequently upheld as compensation
for unquantifiable interests such as mental anguish or a sense of out-
rage engendered by the defendant's aggravated conduct. " Damages in
contract, in contrast, were considered susceptible to objective assess-
ment because they were calculated solely under the terms of the agree-
ment.' 2 Intangible damages, such as pain and suffering and emotional
distress, were not recoverable in contract actions." This tort/contract
distinction, which was based primarily on judicial convenience in mea-
suring damages, foreshadowed the more sophisticated policy argu-
ments that would later arise.
B. Contemporary Approach-Theoretical Distinctions
Modem courts continue to distinguish between tort and contract
damages upon policy considerations. Central to the contemporary
analysis are the perceived distinctions between the divergent remedial
purposes of damage awards in tort and contract actions.
1. Availability of Punitive Damages in Tort Actions
Tort law bases liability on fault, and thus serves both reparative
and admonitory functions.' 4 The reparative function serves to preserve
economic stability by providing monetary compensation for losses.'
5
9. Wilford v. Berkeley, 97 Eng. Rep. 472 (K.B. 1775); Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep.
557 (K.B. 1774). See generally Washington, supra note 8, at 363-64 (explaining
the "rule of certainty").
10. In 1763, one English court remarked: "[I]t is very dangerous for the judges to
intermeddle in damages for torts; it must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous
damages in a tort, and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce a
Court to grant a new trial for excessive damages." Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763). In Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1774),
Chief Justice DeGray summarized the rule as follows: "[Iln torts a greater lati-
tude [than in contract] is allowed to the jury; and damages must be excessive and
outrageous to require or warrant a new trial." Id; see also Beardmore v. Car-
rington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792 (K.B. 1764) (emphasizing judicial reluctance to
revise tort verdicts). Courts granted new trials only when it appeared that the jury
had erroneously assessed the damages. See, e.g., Bright v. Byron, 97 Eng. Rep.
365 (K.B. 1757); Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655); Washington,
supra note 8, at 360.
11. See, e.g., Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492 (1880); Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep.
761 (C.P. 1814); Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
12. See Sharpe v. Brice, 96 Eng. Rep. 557, 557 (K.B. 1774) (contract damages are a
matter of "account"); Beardmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 792 (K.B. 1764)
(noting distinction between assumpsit and trespass).
13. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 145.
14. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1173-76 (1931);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment c (1979); cf. C. McCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 77, at 275-78 (discussing punitive damages as an admonitory ex-
ception to the compensatory function of damages).
15. Morris, supra note 14, at 1173. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
The admonitory function discourages repetition of wrongful conduct
by detering others who are inclined to commit similar wrongs. 16 Puni-
tive damages emphasize the admonitory function, making tort judg-
ments more effective than they would be if damages were limited to
reparative compensation. "
Punitive damages are awarded in tort actions primarily to punish
wrongdoers and to deter others from committing similar wrongs.
18
Borrowing from the punishment-based concepts of criminal law,' 9
awards of punitive damages are generally aimed at the most reprehen-
sible conduct. To identify those instances when this conduct exists,
courts have formulated the malice requirement.20 Absent proof that
the defendant acted maliciously, a plaintiff cannot recover punitive
damages.2'
In addition to the above, the judiciary has also given other reasons
for awarding punitive damages in tort actions. For example, courts
may award punitive damages to protect the public interest. This policy,
often referred to as the private attorney general theory,22 is premised
upon the belief that punitive damages will encourage plaintiffs to bring
actions against those wrongdoers who engage in serious misconduct
and who might otherwise not be prosecuted. 23 Moreover, punitive
damages preserve societal peace by acting as a form of vindication for
the plaintiff.24 This attractive judicial remedy discourages private ven-
§ 901 comment c (1979) (one of the original purposes of tort law was to encourage
injured parties to resort to legal process, rather than to seek self-help).
16. Morris, supra note 14, at 1174.
17. Id at 1187-88.
18. Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 141, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (1982); Philadelphia, W. &
B. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307-08 (1884). See generally Belli, supra note 6,
at 5-7 (punitive damages justified on basis of revenge, public justice, compensa-
tion, punishment, and deterrence).
19. Indeed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has reviewed an award of punitive
damages in a tort case and held that the rules governing appellate review of crimi-
nal sentences should be applied by analogy. Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 141-
42, 442 A.2d 966, 973 (1982) (citing Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480-87, 425 A.2d
632, 642-46 (1981)).
20. Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 298 Md. 611, 627, 471 A.2d 735, 743
(1984); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 42-46, 338 A.2d 48, 52-53
(1975); Associate Discount v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 581-82, 278 A.2d 592, 597-98
(1971).
21. For an extensive discussion of the malice requirement, see infra notes 64-84 and
accompanying text.
22. See Belli, supra note 6, at 7; Long, Punitive Damages. An Unsettled Doctrine, 25
DRAKE L. REV. 870, 879-80 (1976); Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liabiliy
Actions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1277-78 (1976).
23. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d
488, 490 (1961); D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 205; see also Morris, supra note
14, at 1183 (recovery of punitive damages motivates plaintiff to bring tort action
when the actual injury is not great and thus serves to protect society's interest in
general security).
24. Belli, supra note 6, at 5; Long, supra note 22, at 877.
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geance.25 Finally, punitive damages provide recourse for intangible
and otherwise legally incompensable injuries.26 In these cases the in-
jured party's actual monetary damages are minimal, but he has never-
theless suffered a wrong for which the defendant ought to be
punished.27
2. Prohibition of Punitive Damages in Contract
The central purpose of damages iii actions for breach of contract is
to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied had
the contract not been breached.28 Consequently, punitive damages are
not awarded for mere breach of contract, 29 regardless of the motives or
conduct of the breaching party." Several policy justifications underlie
this rule.3 1 First, granting punitive damages in contract actions will
introduce needless uncertainty and apprehension into commercial
transactions. 32 Since compensatory damages alone may adequately de-
ter breaches of contracts, 33 they may alone support the security of busi-
ness transactions. In short, imposing punitive damages may serve to
25. Belli, supra note 6, at 5.
26. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 77, at 275-78 (punitive damages serve as
extra compensation for injured feelings and sense of outrage); Long, supra note
22, at 875-76 (noting several authorities state that punitive damages are exclu-
sively compensatory); Owen, supra note 22, at 1295-99 (residual compensation).
27. Three jurisdictions expressly recognize compensation as the function of punitive
damages. See Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930) (punitive
damages awarded as compensation and cannot exceed amount of plaintiff's ex-
penses of litigation less taxable costs); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W.
746 (1922) (punitive damages may be assessed as compensation for intangible ele-
ments of a wrong); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873) (punitive damages awarded
to compensate plaintiff for indignity and suffering caused by defendant).
28. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 992 at 5; D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.1, at
786; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 137, at 560-62; see also Chamberlain v. Bal-
timore & Ohio R.R., 66 Md. 518, 529, 8 A. 267, 270-71 (1887) (court should en-
deavor to place injured party, as far as possible by monetary award, in position he
would have been had the contract been performed). The compensatory award
serves to restore the injured party's restitution, reliance, and expectation interests.
The restitution interest is the value of the benefit the plaintiff conferred upon the
breaching party; the reliance interest is the pecuniary loss the plaintiff incurred
while preparing to perform the contract or accept its benefit; and the expectation
interest is the profit the plaintiff would have received had the contract not been
breached, i.e., the benefit of his bargain. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 12.1, at 786-
88.
29. See supra note 2.
30. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 638-39, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977);
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 57, 338 A.2d 43, 47 (1975). See
generaly Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST. L.J.
284, 286 (1959) (motive is irrelevant in a contract action).
31. For an extensive discussion of these policies, see infra notes 110-16 and accompa-
nying text.
32. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 639, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977).
33. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1002, at 33-34; Note, Punitive Damages in
Contract Actions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule, 20 WASHBURN L.J.
86, 91-92 (1980).
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chill economic interaction. Second, if a party is apprehensive about the
possibility of incurring punitive damages for contractual breaches, an
inefficient allocation of resources may result by encouraging perform-
ance of unwise contracts. 34 Third, a failure to perform an obligation
does not engender the type of resentment and mental distress found in
most tort cases and, therefore, the sanctions imposed for these breaches
need not be as severe.35
The dichotomy between the availability of punitive damages in
tort and contract actions may also be attributable to the nature of the
duties imposed. Tort liability is based on the breach of a duty that
society has imposed on its members. Liability arises from a breached
duty to society as a whole. In contract, however, the nature and extent
of the duty are derived from the agreement itself, which parties enter
into privately. 36 Since a breach of contract is only a breach of a private
duty to a single individual, it does not violate societal standards to the
same extent as tortious conduct,37 and thus the need for admonition is
not as strong in contract as it is in tort.
III. TORT ARISING OUT OF CONTRACT-A UNIQUE
MARYLAND HYBRID
While the tort/contract distinction functions well in a vacuum,
problems arise when the two bodies of law are merged into a single
lawsuit. Specifically, the act of breaching a contractual obligation can
frequently give rise to a separate cause of action in tort. These hybrid
cases force courts to determine whether to apply contract or tort princi-
ples. Maryland courts have attempted to resolve this problem by fash-
ioning a complex set of rules to cover torts arising out of contracts.
From their inception in 1908,38 though, these rules have undergone nu-
merous changes.
A. Development of the Malice Standard
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co.,3 9 a 1908 Court of
Appeals of Maryland decision, is the seminal case concerning the avail-
34. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
35. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 638-39, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977).
36. See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 218-19; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 92, at
613 ("[C]ontract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties mani-
festing consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the
contract.").
37. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 218-19.
38. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908); see
H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 44-45, 338 A.2d 48, 53 (1975) (refer-
ring to Knickerbocker Ice as the landmark torts case arising out of contract). The
Knickerbocker Ice court stated: "In a suit between the parties to a contract the
general rule is that whether it be an action ex contractu, or an action of tort,
founded on the breach of contract, the measure of damages is the same and under
control of the court." Knickerbocker Ice, 107 Md. at 569, 69 A. at 410.
39. 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908).
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ability of punitive damages in torts arising out of contract. Knicker-
bocker Ice involved a claim that an ice manufacturer intentionally
interfered with a contract between one of its customers and a distribu-
tor.40 In denying the dairy's request for punitive damages, the court of
appeals stated that the dairy could recover these damages only if it es-
tablished that the ice manufacturer had breached the contract for the"sole purpose and with the deliberate intention of wrongfully injuring
the plaintiff."'" Despite the dairy's inability to establish the requisite
culpability, Knickerbocker Ice signaled that a cause of action existed
for torts arising out of contract.
Sixty-six years later, the court of appeals again analyzed a case
involving a tort arising out of contract. In the 1975 decision of H & R
Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 42 a married couple sought punitive damages
from their tax preparer who negligently prepared an income tax return.
The plaintiffs alleged that the preparer had acted in a negligent, wan-
ton, and intentional manner. The trial court, dismissing the plaintiffs'
request for punitive damages, limited the plaintiffs to the recovery of
compensatory damages. Although the court of special appeals dis-
agreed with this determination, the court of appeals ultimately affirmed
the trial court.43 The court of appeals found that a dismissal was ap-
propriate because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the tax
preparer acted with "express malice," i.e., a deliberate intention to in-
jure the plaintiffs." Since the record merely revealed that the tax
preparer had acted to benefit itself, the Testerman court determined
that greed fell short of a showing of a deliberate intention to wrongfully
injure the plaintiffs.45
The Testerman formulation, though, failed to provide the defini-
tive statement on the availability of punitive damages in torts arising
out of contract. Indeed, one year later the court was again called upon
to resolve the issue. In Henderson v. Maryland National Bank, 46 a pur-
chaser of a new automobile entered into an installment sales agreement
that was financed through the defendant bank. The case arose out of
clerical errors that resulted in the bank sending several deficiency no-
tices to the purchaser. Despite the purchaser's repeated efforts to in-
form the bank of its errors, the bank continued to assert that the loan
40. Id at 558, 69 A.2d at 406. The plaintiff, a dairy, consumed large quantities of ice
during the spring and summer. The ice was purchased from an intermediary who
obtained the ice from the defendant ice manufacturer. When the ice manufac-
turer discovered the arrangement, it forced the intermediary to sever its relation-
ship with the dairy. Subsequently, the ice manufacturer contracted to sell ice
directly to the dairy at an inflated price. 1d
41. Id. at 569, 69 A. at 410.
42. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
43. Testerman v. H & R Block, Inc., 22 Md. App. 320, 324 A.2d 145 (1974), rev'd, 275
Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
44. Testerman, 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 53-54.
45. Id at 44, 338 A.2d at 53.
46. 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976).
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was in default. Following further internal blundering, and the pur-
chaser's adamant refusal to bring all of his records to clarify the matter,
the bank repossessed the purchaser's automobile.47 The repossession
was accomplished without a court order and without first notifying the
purchaser of the action contemplated. The purchaser, who sued the
bank for breach of contract and conversion, sought compensatory and
punitive damages. After reciting the Testerman rule that the plaintiff
must establish actual malice to recover punitive damages in a tort aris-
ing out of contract, the Henderson court noted that "[i]n the commer-
cial sphere, . . . such emotions as anger or spite are not always vented
in a direct manner."48 Based on this recognition of commercial reali-
ties, the Henderson court permitted proof of actual malice by inference
from the "facts and circumstances surrounding the tortious conduct."49
Under this rule, a plaintiff could recover punitive damages through the
use of circumstantial rather than direct evidence to establish actual
malice on the part of the defendant. In affirming the jury's award of
punitive damages against the bank, the Henderson court reasoned that
the trier of fact could have inferred from the circumstances that the
bank's decision to repossess the automobile was influenced by anger
and a desire to punish the purchaser for his refusal to produce his
records. 50
B. The Scope of the Doctrine
Once the court of appeals formulated the malice standard, it began
to define the scope of the rules governing torts arising out of contracts.
In a series of decisions, the court of appeals sought to define exactly
when a tort arose out of contract. Under the Testerman standard, if the
tort arose independently of the contract, a plaintiff would have to show
implied malice5 to recover punitive damages. By contrast, if the tort
arose out of the contract, the plaintiff would have to establish actual
malice to recover punitive damages.
The court first analyzed this distinction in Wedeman v. City Chev-
rolet Co. 52 In Wedeman, a purchaser bought an automobile that the
seller had represented as never having been involved in an accident.
When he later discovered the falsity of the seller's assertion, the pur-
chaser brought an action for fraud. Based upon these facts, a jury
awarded the purchaser punitive damages. The Court of Special Ap-
47. Id. at 515-17, 366 A.2d at 2-3.
48. Id at 520, 366 A.2d at 4.
49. Id at 520-23, 366 A.2d at 4-6.
50. Id
51. Implied malice requires a showing of extreme recklessness or a callous disregard
of the plaintiffs rights. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168, 297
A.2d 721, 731 (1972); Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 71, 257 A.2d 187, 198
(1969). For a further discussion of the implied malice standard, see infra text
accompanying notes 64-69.
52. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
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peals of Maryland set aside the punitive damages verdict because the
purchaser had failed to establish actual malice. 3 In a unanimous deci-
sion, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the case did not involve
a tort arising out of contract.5 4 Instead, the court analyzed all the cases
upon which the Testerman court had relied" and concluded that all the
cases "had in common one salient fact: the contractual relationship
preexisted the tortious conduct."56 Since the fraudulent representations
had merely induced the contract, the Wedeman court found that the
tort had arisen outside the boundaries of the sales agreement.5 ' As a
result, the court reinstated a jury verdict that was based on an implied
malice instruction because the purchaser was not required to show ac-
tual malice.
In General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 58 the court of appeals held that
an employer's unlawful detention of an employee suspected of theft did
not arise out of an employment contract. Although it cited various rea-
sons, the Piskor court placed heavy reliance on what it termed a "col-
lateral" connection between the tortious acts and the breach of the
employment contract. 9 In articulating a "but for" test to govern the
nature of this nexus, the court stated, "the tortious conduct and the
contract [must be] so intertwined that one could not be viewed in isola-
tion of the other."6 Holding that this nexus requirement had not been
met, the court held that the defendant's tortious acts had arisen outside
of the contractual relationship. Accordingly, the trial court's use of an
implied malice jury instruction was affirmed by the court of appeals.
IV. THE CONTOURS OF THE DOCTRINE
Using Testerman, Henderson, Wedeman, and Piskor as a basis,
Maryland's courts have provided some guidance in determining when
a tort arises out of contract and in measuring the appropriate level of
malice. In general, three basic elements comprise a claim for punitive
damages in actions involving torts arising out of contracts: (1) actual
53. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 30 Md. App. 637, 643, 354 A.2d 185, 189, rev'd,
278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
54. Wedeman, 278 Md. at 553, 366 A.2d at 13.
55. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972) (con-
version of checking account funds); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life
Ins., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (breach of contract and negligent performance of
contractual obligation), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Damazo v. Wahby, 259
Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970) (tortious interference with contract); Rinaldi v.
Tana, 252 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533 (1969) (per curiam) (tortious interference with
contract); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 569-70, 69
A. 405, 410 (1908) (tortious interference with contract).
56. Wedeman, 278 Md. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11.
57. Id.
58. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
59. Id at 637-40, 381 A.2d at 21-22. For a discussion of these reasons, see infra notes
96-103 and accompanying text.
60. Piskor, 281 Md. at 637, 381 A.2d at 21.
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malice; (2) a contract that precedes the tort; and (3) a nexus between
the contract and the alleged tort. When the latter two elements are
present, the first becomes applicable. One commentator would add the
additional element of establishing that the contractual breach gave rise
to a separate tort claim.6 Since punitive damages are never recover-
able in pure contract actions,62 by definition the plaintiff must allege a
separate cause of action in tort.63
A. Actual Malice: An Element and an Objective
Nearly all torts arising out of contract disputes involve the level of
malice the plaintiff must show to recover punitive damages. The two
major categories of malice are actual malice and implied malice. The
Henderson court may have added a third category - inferred actual
malice. It is crucial to distinguish between these three categories be-
cause, without actual malice or inferred actual malice, a plaintiff can-
not recover punitive damages in a case involving a tort arising out of
contract.
In an ordinary tort action, the plaintiff can recover punitive dam-
ages upon proof that the defendant's conduct was motivated by either
actual malice or implied malice.' Actual malice is "the performance
of an unlawful act, intentionally or wantonly, without legal justification
or excuse but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate; the
purpose being to deliberately and wilfully injure the plaintiff. ' 65 Im-
plied malice, a lesser standard, requires a showing of extreme reckless-
ness or a callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights.66 This distinction is
crucial in cases involving torts arising out of contract because the plain-
tiff must shoulder the onerous burden of proving actual malice.67 If the
61. McCadden, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases in Maryland, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 203,
217 (1977).
62. See supra note 2.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, at 154 (1981) (to obtain puni-
tive damages in a contract action, the factual allegations must give rise to a cause
of action in tort).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168, 297 A.2d 721, 731
(1972) (wrongful death action attributable to driving while intoxicated); Siegman
v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 316, 297 A.2d 758, 762 (1972) (conversion/
wrongful dishonor); D.C. Transit Sys. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 583-84, 287 A.2d
251, 254 (1972) (false imprisonment); Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 351-52,
283 A.2d 392, 398 (1971) (false imprisonment/assault); Associates Discount v.
Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 582, 278 A.2d 592, 598 (1971) (trespass); American Laundry
Mach. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 115-16, 412 A.2d 407, 416 (1980) (products
liability); GAI Audio of N.Y. v. CBS, 27 Md. App. 172, 203-04, 340 A.2d 736,
754-55 (1975) (unfair competition).
65. Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 352, 283 A.2d 392, 398 (1971).
66. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168, 297 A.2d 721, 731 (1972);
Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 71, 257 A.2d 187, 198 (1969).
67. In a candid remark, the court of special appeals has referred to the actual malice
standard as an "insurmountable roadblock." Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler Aviation
Int'l, 44 Md. App. 610, 626, 411 A.2d 1055, 1064, cert. denied, 287 Md. 749 (1980).
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record lacks evidence of hate or spite,6" a plaintiff will not be entitled to
punitive damages as a matter of law.6 9 For that reason alone, the bur-
den may sometimes be insurmountable.
Actual malice is difficult to show because many cases involving
torts arising out of contracts have developed in commercial settings.7"
First, while greed and a desire to profit at the plaintiff's expense are
sufficient to establish implied malice, this conduct does not rise to the
level of actual malice.7' Thus, for example, the desire to secure a more
favorable contractual arrangement or a fraudulent representation con-
cerning the value of an automobile does not rise to the level of actual
malice.
Second, actual malice is established only when there is evidence of
conduct that is inspired solely by a malignant desire to injure another
wrongfully. Of course, parties to commercial dealings seldom articu-
late or record their animosity toward others.72 The court of appeals,
though, has recognized these evidentiary problems. For example, the
Henderson court permitted the plaintiff to establish actual malice by
circumstantial evidence, stating that in a commercial setting a court
68. On appeal, some evidence of animosity must appear in the record. See, e.g., Mc-
Clung-Logan v. Thomas, 259 Md. 136, 149, 172 A.2d 494, 500-01 (1961) (evidence
that the plaintiffs numerous complaints provoked a wrongful seizure of his trac-
tor); Rinaldi v. Tana, 252 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533 (1969) (per curiam) (evidence of
intra-family animosity), explained in Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 639, 270
A.2d 814, 819-20 (1970); see also Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 52,
288 A.2d 114, 118 (1972) (invasion of privacy charged against a collection com-
pany that engaged in persistent harassment and used vile and vicious language).
69. While motive is ordinarily a question for the jury, e.g., Wedeman v. City Chevro-
let Co., 278 Md. 524, 533, 366 A.2d 7, 13 (1976); Staub v. Staub, 37 Md. App. 141,
147, 376 A.2d 1129, 1134 (1977), when evidence of animosity is completely lack-
ing, courts have prohibited punitive damages. See Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md.
366, 373-74, 221 A.2d 356, 360 (1966) (jury will not be allowed to speculate about
malice when there is no ground to support this claim); see, e.g., Damazo v.
Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 638-39, 270 A.2d 814, 819 (1970) (upheld trial court's denial
of punitive damages since no animosity appeared in the record); Aeropesca Ltd. v.
Butler Aviation Int'l, 44 Md. App. 610, 626, 411 A.2d 1055, 1064-65 (no evidence
of evil motive or animosity), cert. denied, 287 Md. 749 (1980).
70. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975) (conver-
sion arising out of a dispute over compensation due under an incentive bonus and
retirement plan); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md.
192, 278 A.2d 12 (construction financing), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Aer-
opesca Ltd. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, 44 Md. App. 610, 411 A.2d 1055 (contract to
repair a commercial aircraft), cert. denied, 287 Md. 749 (1980).
71. St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 239, 278
A.2d 12, 34-35, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627,
639, 270 A.2d 814, 819 (1970); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107
Md. 556, 569, 69 A. 405, 410 (1908); National Micrographics Sys. v. Oce-Indus.,
55 Md. App. 526, 545, 465 A.2d 862, 873 (1983); Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler Aviation
Int'l, 44 Md. App. 610, 627, 411 A.2d 1055, 1065, cert. denied, 287 Md. 749 (1980).
72. Testerman v. H & R Block, Inc., 22 Md. App. 320, 340, 324 A.2d 145, 156 (1974)
(citing Geyser v. Holberg, 185 Md. 642, 653, 45 A.2d 735, 737 (1945)), rev'd on
other grounds, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
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may infer actual malice.73 This approach blurs the distinction between
actual and implied malice and widens the scope of the evidence a jury
may consider in finding the existence of malice.
Third, Maryland courts have recognized that the exercise of good
faith business judgment negates malice.74 On several occasions, de-
fendants who would have been subject to punitive damages were able
to escape liability by showing an "honest assertion of a known right."75
In Lawrence v. Graham, 76 for instance, a defendant was able to defeat
efforts to show actual malice by demonstrating that he had acted under
an "honest but mistaken assertion of right when he had repossessed the
plaintiff's car."7 7 Similarly, in Caruso v. Republic Insurance Co., 78 an
insurer failed to pay a claim on fire-damaged property. The insurer,
however, avoided punitive damages because the court found a colora-
ble defense to the insured's claim,79 which was an "absolute defense" to
a finding of bad faith.80 This preclusive rule permits all but the glar-
ingly reckless defendants to avoid punitive damages. The holding in
Henderson warns these individuals that the trier of fact may infer ac-
tual malice from an erroneous claim of right based upon unexplained
blunders.8
In light of these considerations and in an effort to put the plaintiff
to the higher standard of proof, defendants argue that the tort is one
that arises out of contract. Conversely, plaintiffs who wish to avail
themselves of the less rigorous implied malice standard contend that
the wrongful conduct amounts to an independent tort.
B. A Contract Preexists the Tort
It is essential that the contract preexist the tort. Despite its seem-
ing simplicity, this criterion may pose several problems. In obvious
73. Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 523, 366 A.2d 1, 6 (1976). For a
discussion of Henderson, see supra text accompanying notes 46-50; see also
Stouffer v. Alford, 114 Md. 110, 119, 78 A. 387, 390-91 (1910) (plaintiff may use
circumstantial evidence to establish motive with which a party entered into a par-
ticular transaction).
74. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 56, 338 A.2d 43, 47 (1975) (ra-
tional business judgment).
75. Id; see Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 314, 297 A.2d 758, 761
(1972); Heize v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 430, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942); Philadelphia
W. & B. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307 (1884).
76. 29 Md. App. 422, 349 A.2d 271 (1975).
77. Id at 429, 349 A.2d at 275.
78. 558 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1983).
79. Id. at 436.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text; see also Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md.
302, 324-26, 413 A.2d 170, 180-81 (1980) (issue of actual malice inappropriate for
summary judgment because it involves motive and feeling). But see Wesko v.
G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 199, 321 A.2d 529, 533 (1974) (evidence of improper




cases, such as in Wedeman, 8 2 it is relatively easy to determine whether
the fraud occurred before, and thus induced, the formation of the sales
agreement. In contrast, this finding may not be so easily reached when
the parties have an ongoing contractual relationship in which new
agreements are continuously forged. For example, in National
Aicrographics Systems v. Oce-Industries, 83 the court of special appeals
resolved this issue by finding an independent cause of action in tort.
The court, citing Wedeman, reasoned that even though the parties had
a prior ongoing contractual relationship, the fraudulent representations
were attributable solely to the formation of new and separate con-
tracts. 84 The National Aicrographics holding makes clear that a party
who contracts with another on a continuing basis risks greater exposure
to punitive damages.
C The Scope of the Doctrine:. Breach and Nexus
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this concept is determining
when culpable conduct amounts to a tort arising out of contract. This
determination is crucial because it controls the standard of malice that
the plaintiff must meet. If a tort is deemed to have arisen out of a
contract, the plaintiff must establish that actual malice motivated the
defendant's conduct. Two central concepts have emerged from the ju-
dicial discussions of when a tort arises out of a contract. First, the na-
ture of the plaintiffs complaint is critical. If the court characterizes the
defendant's tortious acts as a breach of contract, it is likely that it will
be considered a tort arising out of contract. Second, once a breach is
established, the plaintiff must establish a proper nexus between the
breach and the underlying agreement.
1. The Breach
The label affixed to the plaintiffs tort/contract cause of action may
control whether the tort arose out of contract. 85 The most significant
example is the manner in which the courts have distinguished between
the availability of punitive damages in products liability suits and war-'
ranty claims. Since products liability is considered an action in tort,
82. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); see also Thomas
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617, 429 A.2d 277 (1981) (applying
Wedeman to nearly identical facts).
83. 55 Md. App. 526, 465 A.2d 862 (1983).
84. Id at 543-44, 465 A.2d at 862, 872-73 (citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278
Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976)).
85. Eg., General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 639, 381 A.2d 16, 22-23 (1977)
(false imprisonment and assault were deemed to have arisen separately from the
contract because they were "torts in the purest sense of the term"); Siegman v.
Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 313, 297 A.2d 758, 760 (1972) (rejecting argu-
ment that case arose out of a breach of contract because the "appellants... have
... brought this suit in tort for conversion and wrongful dishonor.").
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courts have applied the implied malice standard. 86 Conversely, be-
cause warranty violations are regarded as actions in contract, a plaintiff
must satisfy the actual malice standard.87
In addition to the contract/tort distinction, the court of special ap-
peals has also relied upon contractual privity to justify the warranty/
products liability dichotomy. In American Laundry Machines v.
Horan, 8 8 the court cited the absence of privity in products liability suits
as a justification for allowing plaintiffs to proceed under the less rigor-
ous implied malice standard.89 This reasoning, however, is difficult to
understand in view of the General Assembly's abrogation of the privity
requirement in warranty actions.90 Either American Laundry fashioned
a new privity rule to justify its distinction between warranty and prod-
ucts liability actions for purposes of deciding the availability of puni-
tive damages, or its decision is limited to transactions that do not fall
within Maryland's version of the Uniform Commercial Code. If the
latter is correct, it is difficult to imagine a transaction that could give
rise to a products liability claim without falling within the state's
broadly termed warranty scheme. 9'
Another example of the important role that classifying a cause of
86. Harley-Davidson v. Wisniewski, 50 Md. App. 339, 437 A.2d 700 (1981), cert. de-
nied, 292 Md. 596 (1982); American Laundry Mach. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97,
412 A.2d 407 (1980). See generally Owen, supra note 22, at 1257 (analyzing rea-
sons for awarding punitive damages).
87. Saval v. B.L. Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1034 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Maryland law);
Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48 Md. App. 617, 627 n.6, 429 A.2d 277, 284
n.6 (1981); Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc., 37 Md. App. 470, 475, 378 A.2d 1, 4
(1977). The Sims court reasoned that, since MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 2-714
to -715 (1975) only provide for incidental and consequential damages, punitive
damages would be inappropriate. Sims, 37 Md. App. at 475, 378 A.2d at 4. But
see Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 315 n.3, 297 A.2d 758, 761 n.3
(1972) (punitive damages allowed even though they were not authorized by MD.
COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-402 (1975)).
88. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980).
89. The American Laundry court reasoned that:
the underlying contention in these cases is that a defective product capa-
ble (or likely) of producing injury was placed on the market; and that
process of marketing normally involves a contract of some sort. In a
very real sense, therefore, a product liability action is one that arises out
of a contractual relationship. But it is not, in this case at least, a contrac-
tual relationship to which the plaintiff-appellees were parties. The tort
here did not arise from any contract entered into by Horan and Jessop.
Id at 116, 412 A.2d at 418-19.
90. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314(1)(a)-(b) (1975) states: (a) "In §§ 2-314
through 2-318 of this title, 'seller' includes the manufacturer, distributor, dealer,
wholesaler or other middleman or the retailer; and (b) Any previous requirement
of privity is abolished as between the buyer and the seller in any action brought
by the buyer." Privity considerations are presently limited to situations when the
plaintiff is a non-purchasing third party. Id § 2-318.
91. Not only is the privity requirement abolished in warranty suits, id § 2-314, but
Maryland law prohibits disclaimers of implied warranties for consumer goods.
Id § 2-316.1 (Supp. 1983); see also id § 2-314(4) (includes transactions in lease-
hold goods under the warranty scheme). See generally Anthony Pools, Inc. v.
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action may have is contained in General Motors Corp. v. Piskor. 92 The
Piskor court stated that false imprisonment and assault, the tortious
acts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint, were "torts in the purest sense
of that term." 93 This concept, though, is ambiguous because the court
of appeals has yet to draw a distinction between pure and impure torts.
It is not the intentional nature of the acts that is determinative because
conversion, which often is a tort arising out of contract,94 is also an
intentional tort. Rather, the Piskor court most likely looked to the ma-
licious nature of the torts and viewed them as inherently more culpa-
ble.95 Using a malice component to define the scope of torts arising out
of contract, however, can only generate further confusion as advocates
must somehow cull pure torts from impure torts.
The foregoing makes clear that the characterization of a cause of
action can be decisive. If the plaintiff alleges claims that are essentially
tort actions, he will most likely be allowed to proceed under an implied
malice standard. By contrast, if he chooses to plead a contract or war-
ranty claim, it is likely that he will have to surmount the actual malice
requirement to be entitled to punitive damages.
2. The Nexus
Once a court determines that culpable conduct causes a breach of
the agreement, there must be a simultaneous finding that the claimed
tortious conduct arose "directly from performance or breach of the
contract. '9 6 This nexus requirement, however, is irreconciliable with
the decision that articulated it.
In General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 97 an employee brought assault
Sheehan, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983) (broadly construing the warranty pro-
visions in hybrid transactions involving sales of goods and services).
92. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
93. Id at 639, 381 A.2d at 22.
94. See, e.g., Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976);
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975).
95. The Piskor court noted that actual malice had not been considered a prerequisite
to recovery of punitive damages in any of its recent decisions involving false im-
prisonment or assault. Piskor, 281 Md. at 637-38, 381 A.2d at 21-22. None of the
cases listed in support of this proposition, however, discussed the tort arising out
of contract issue. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 419-21, 298
A.2d 16, 24-25 (1972) (assault and false imprisonment of store patron; "wanton"
conduct included in definition of malice); D.C. Transit Sys. v. Brooks, 264 Md.
578, 583-85, 287 A.2d 251, 254-55 (1972) (false imprisonment and malicious pros-
ecution of bus passenger; actual malice not required when defendant "breached
the contract for safe carriage by unlawfully depriving [plaintiff] of his liberty");
Vanchierie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 373-74, 221 A.2d 356, 360 (1966) (dictum)
(assault and battery of restaurant customer; punitive damages justified when in-
jury was "wantonly inflicted"); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610,
617, 56 A.2d 813, 817 (1948) (false imprisonment of street car passenger; punitive
damages recoverable on proof of "at least ... reckless disregard of the rights of
the person injured").
96. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 637, 381 A.2d 16, 21 (1977).
97. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
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and false imprisonment claims against his employer after he had been
detained by company security guards and accused of stealing company
property. The court assumed that an employment contract, together
with collective bargaining agreements and company policies, was ap-
plicable to the accosting suffered by the plaintiff.9" Rather than recog-
nizing what appeared to be a tort that had arisen out of the various
agreements, the Piskor court held that the tortious conduct was merely
"collateral" to the underlying contract.99 Because of this indirect rela-
tionship, the court indicated that the plaintiff would only have to show
implied malice to recover punitive damages from his former employer.
Piskor creates uncertainty because it failed to explain why a tort
arising out of an employment agreement should be treated differently
from incidents involving carelessly prepared tax returns or converted
automobiles. One plausible explanation is that the court recognized
that the doctrine is inapplicable when the potential class of defendants
extends beyond the parties to the agreement. This conclusion is but-
tressed by the Piskor court's reliance upon Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Keulemans. 100 Keulemans involved a stock manager who was falsely
accused of shoplifting while shopping in his employer's store. The
court of appeals, without alluding to whether the tort had arisen out of
a contract,' 0 ' allowed the plaintiff to proceed under an implied malice
standard. The Piskor court viewed the decision as support for its find-
ing that the nexus requirement was lacking.1 2 Under the above expla-
nation, one can presume that the nexus was lacking because anyone
could have been subjected to the same unlawful detention; the contrac-
tual relationship did not create a set of protections that were unique to
the employment relationship. Factually, Piskor is difficult to reconcile
with this theory because the plaintiff was accosted in an automobile
plant, an area where only employees were allowed. The court of ap-
peals, however, has yet to give the precise meaning of Piskor. 103
D. Practical Considerations
The interrelationship between the laws governing the availability
of punitive damages in torts, contracts, and torts arising out of con-
tracts is subtle and often elusive. Successful recovery of-or defense
98. Id at 634-35, 381 A.2d at 20.
99. Id at 639, 381 A.2d at 23.
100. 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975).
101. The Keulemans court had to decide whether a jury could award punitive damages
when a store security guard lacked probable cause to detain the employee. In
sustaining an award of punitive damages, the court applied an implied malice
standard without ever considering whether the tort had arisen out of the contrac-
tual relationship between the parties. Id at 448-49, 340 A.2d at 709-10.
102. Piskor, 281 Md. at 638-39, 381 A.2d at 22.
103. See R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer, Cernick, Corrubia, Inc., No.
82-2836 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 1984) (conduct pertaining to collapse of a wall held
"intertwined" to contract so that actual malice standard applies).
[Vol. 13
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against-an award of punitive damages depends upon the ability of the
litigants to master this interrelationship. The divergent positions ad-
vanced by the plaintiff and defendant illustrates how litigants should
approach this task.
Generally, the plaintiff will urge that the tort did not arise out of a
contract. In making this argument, the plaintiff must first determine
whether the tortious conduct can be separated from the contractual re-
lationship so that the conduct will be perceived as a tort that arose in-
dependently of the contract. The most common example is when the
tort preceded the contract."° Provided the plaintiff can separate the
tort from the contract, he may seek punitive damages under the less
stringent implied malice standard. If, however, the tortious conduct
has its source in the contract, the plaintiff will be required to establish
actual malice. Although actual malice is difficult to prove, Henderson
indicates that actual malice can be inferred in cases involving commer-
cial relationships. °5
Defendants, by contrast, should contend that their alleged wrong-
doing amounts to a tort arising out of contract. Defendants must show
that the tortious conduct is so intertwined with the breached agreement
that, but for the contract, the plaintiff would have no cause of action in
tort. Provided the defendant is successful in this argument, the court
will apply the stringent actual malice standard. Efforts to rely upon
Henderson to temper the actual malice requirement should be rebuffed
by a limited reading of the case. Only when the defendant's acts are so
glaringly reckless as to defy any suggestion of proper motives should
the trier of fact be permitted to infer actual malice. Moreover, any jury
instruction involving inferred actual malice should direct that the trier
of fact must infer animosity or hatred, not merely disorganized proce-
dures, communication breakdowns, or reckless blundering."°
The divergent nature of these strategies can best be illustrated by
examining their interaction in an actual case, Weston International v.
Woodlawn Supermarkets. 107 This case involved a cause of action that
could have been characterized as a breach of contract, a tort, or a tort
arising out of contract. The case arose out of a dispute over whether an
agreement to obtain refrigeration equipment was a lease or a sale. The
plaintiff-lessee contended that the agreement was a contract to sell the
equipment, with the purchase price to be paid in eighteen installments
over a four-year period. Under this theory, the plaintiff could recover
the amount of a nineteenth payment that he had mistakenly tendered
104. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
107. No. 12556, fol. 954, docket 1977, Superior Court of Baltimore City [now the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City], appeal dismissed 44 Md. App. 390, 408 A.2d 781




to the defendant. The defendant responded that the agreement was a
lease and therefore the nineteenth payment would not be reimbursed
unless the equipment was returned.
Since the plaintiff alleged alternative claims for breach of contract
and for conversion, the case could have been decided one of three
ways. First, the court could have found that the action was solely for
breach of contract. Under this finding, the plaintiff would have been
denied access to punitive damages. Second, the court could have held
that the tort arose out of the contract. This finding would have entitled
the plaintiff to an instruction on punitive damages, albeit based on the
actual malice standard. Third, the court could have adopted the plain-
tifi's argument that the tort, alleged conversion, arose independently of
the contract. The tort occurred after the contract terminated and repre-
sented nothing more than an effort to withhold funds that the defend-
ant had no contractual right to retain. The plaintiff ultimately
recovered punitive damages under this theory.1
0 8
V. ANALYSIS: TOWARD A MORE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD
After considering for the past decade the standard for recovering
punitive damages in torts arising out of contracts, Maryland's courts
have yet to fashion a workable set of rules. Based on the complexity of
the subject matter and the rationale for awarding punitive damages, 0 9
courts should adopt a more uniform standard that would apply equally
to "pure" torts and torts arising out of contract. This standard would
dispense with the necessity for deciding whether a tort arises out of
contract by replacing the existing rules with a punitive damages stan-
dard that would apply equally to tort and contract actions.
A. Problems with the Traditional Jusifications for Prohibiting
Punitive Damages in Contract Actions
The contemporary debate on the availability of punitive damages
in contract actions deals primarily with economic considerations.
Those in favor of maintaining the current rule prohibiting the recovery
of punitive damages in contract actions contend that the spectre of pu-
nitive damages will have a chilling effect on commercial transac-
108. The trial court actually instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages
based on either actual or implied malice, thus apparently concluding that the
plaintiff had established conversion and that the tort did not arise out of the con-
tract because the tort was committed after the expiration of the contract. The
defendant appealed and the court of special appeals dismissed the appeal on pro-
cedural grounds. The court remarked, however, that it would have affirmed the
trial court on the merits. The jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for
compensatory and punitive damages. Weston Int'l v. Woodlawn Supermarkets,
44 Md. App. 390, 408 A.2d 781 (1979).
109. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
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tions. " These proponents argue that would-be contracting parties will
be reluctant to enter into agreements that might ultimately result in
unlimited liability. 1'
Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts posits that
contract-related punitive damages would restrain persons who were al-
ready parties to an agreement from breaching agreements to pursue
more profitable and economically efficient ventures. 2 To understand
the societal interest in promoting profitable breaches, it is necessary to
examine the efficient breach theory. This theory is based upon the
premise that it is economically desirable to have resources devoted to
their most profitable uses." 1 3 To this end, limited contractual liability
permits parties to remove themselves from one commercial relationship
if they have found a more profitable market for their products." 14
The traditional notion that contract damages should protect the
nonbreaching party's expectation 5 interest is consistent with the effi-
cient breach theory. Ideally, a party to an unprofitable bargain can
compensate the other parties and be free to pursue more profitable ven-
tures." 16 When commercial transactions function efficiently, consumers
avoid subsidizing what are essentially bad bargains. Although efficient
110. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 638-39, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977).
111. See id; K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.5, at 41 (1980); Note, supra note 33,
at 91-92. The theory is premised upon the risks anticipated by a prospective con-
tracting party. While the likelihood of an accidental breach or erroneous belief
about the scope of the contractual obligation are always possible, the prospect of
incurring unlimited liability is not. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 81, at 291. It
is the added risk that would produce "disasterous uncertainty." 1d § 81, at 289
n.41.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note at 100, reporter's note
at 101 (1981).
113. The theory is predicated upon the belief that resources will be more efficiently
allocated if a party can fully compensate the nonbreaching party and still make a
profit by breaching. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3 (1983); Goetz & Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Princple." Some Notes on
an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554,
558 (1977); Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 114 (1981). See generally Bar-
ton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 277
(1972) (discussing the economics of breach theory); Birmingham, Breach of Con-
tract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273
(1970) (general discussion of the theory).
114. Principles of economic efficiency function especially well in commercial transac-
tions because the nonbreaching party is usually interested in securing his financial
benefit. Once his expectation interest is compensated, he will not be concerned
that the breaching party has failed to adhere to the terms of the bargain. Linzer,
supra note 113, at 115-16.
115. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181
Md. 295, 301-02, 29 A.2d 653, 655-56 (1943); Abott v. Gatch, 13 Md. 314, 332-33
(1859); Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 179, 399 A.2d 1374, 1379 (1979).
The expectation interest is defined as the contemplated profit at the time of con-
tracting. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, at 812-13.
116. This assumes of course that the substitute contract is more profitable after com-
pensatory damages have been paid. See supra note 113.
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breach arguments frequently arise in situations involving specific per-
formance,' 17 these arguments apply as well to claims for punitive dam-
ages."' A fear of incurring liability beyond the expectation interest, it
is argued, would destroy the economic incentive to search for more
profitable ventures." 9 As a result, parties would continue to perform
inefficient agreements with the resulting unnecessary costs being borne
by the consumer.
These theories, however, rest on the mistaken assumption that pu-
nitive damages will be available in all contract actions. No authority
has yet taken this extreme position. 12 Rather, the availability of puni-
tive damages is only urged when there is evidence that the defendant
has acted maliciously.12" ' The malice requirement, common to all other
actions, 22 would not be eliminated; instead, only the dichotomy be-
tween the availability of punitive damages in tort and tort arising out of
contract actions would be abolished. Only malicious conduct would be
deterred, not the commercial freedom to escape disadvantageous rela-
tionships.123 In sum, the societal interest in promoting freely escapable
contracts is tempered only by the competing interest of discouraging
conduct that amounts to a willful disregard for the rights of others.
Equally unpersuasive is the contention that parties will not con-
tract for fear of being exposed to punitive damages. This contention
fails to consider that Maryland has already expanded the scope of lia-
bility that can arise from commercial agreements. 24 First, in the area
of products liability, courts have allowed recovery of punitive damages
upon the less stringent implied malice standard. 25 Second, Maryland
117. See, e.g., Kronman, Specic Performance, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 351, 369-76 (1978);
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 274-78 (1979).
118. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 113, at 818-19.
119. For example, one commentator contends that even a liquidated damages clause
would deprive the breaching party of any excess profit that he might make by
securing a more profitable deal. Linzer, supra note 113, at 562.
120. Cf. Louderback & Jurika, Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 187, 206 (1982) (punitive damages should be available
to those who can establish bad faith coupled with overreaching).
121. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 207. For example, the Restatement requires that all torts
arising out of contracts must meet the malice standard that would apply in a non-
contract tort case. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, at 155 com-
ment b (1981) (citing the malice standard that appears at RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 908, at 464 (1979)).
122. See supra note 64.
123. Either actual or implied malice would apply. For an explanation of the applica-
tion of the different malice standards, see supra notes 64-81 and accompanying
text.
124. Some torts that arise in commercial contexts have been recognized as pure torts
that require a finding of only implied malice to award punitive damages. See,
e.g., Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive, 214 F. Supp. 383, 412-14 (D. Md.
1963) (unfair competition); GAI Audio, Inc. v. CBS, 27 Md. App. 172, 201-06, 340
A.2d 736, 753-56 (1975) (misappropriation of trade secrets).
125. Although Maryland has adopted strict liability for manufacturing defects, courts
thus far have been unwilling to allow punitive damages in cases involving strict
liability. See Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 705 (D. Md.
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courts have allowed the recovery of reliance damages when the non-
breaching party's expectation interest cannot be calculated with the
requisite degree of certainty. 26 Although these damages are a well rec-
ognized alternative to expectation damages,127 they can result in a ver-
dict that greatly exceeds the expectation interest. For example, in
Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd., 128 a plaintiff was permitted
to recover all its start-up costs from an attorney who had defectively
incorporated its venture. 129 These costs were substantially in excess of
the bargain entered into between the attorney and his client. Conse-
quently, those who contract in situations where the expectation interest
is highly speculative risk having to pay the nonbreaching party's ex-
penses, regardless of amount or what the contemplated benefit of the
bargain might have been. Despite this liberal development, there has
been no significant disruption of the state's economy.
131
1981) (citing four unreported cases from the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland). The proclaimed reason for precluding these awards is that
suppliers of chattels are liable, regardless of fault. Id Punitive damages would,
however, be allowed for a loss of consortium caused by the defendant's negli-
gence. Id at 705-06; cf. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363
A.2d 955, 963-64 (1976) (third party beneficiary of seller's warranty can maintain
a loss of consortium claim arising out of a breach of warranty). The availability
of punitive damages in products liability cases has been the subject of considera-
ble debate. Compare Owen, supra note 22, at 1361-70 (advocating the availability
of punitive damages) with Tozer, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6
GA. L. REV. 613 (1972) (arguing against allowing punitive damages). Many of the
issues raised in this debate are analogous to those raised in torts arising out of
contract. See Owen, supra note 22, at 1271-77 (advocating the adoption of puni-
tive damages in product liability cases).
126. Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 53 Md. App. 656, 456 A.2d 82, cert. denied,
296 Md. 112 (1983); Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374
(1979).
127. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1031 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 349 (1982). These damages include all preparation expenses. Dialist
Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 184, 399 A.2d 1374, 1380 (1979).
128. 53 Md. App. 656, 456 A.2d 82, cert. denied, 296 Md. 112 (1983).
129. The venture involved an effort to gain television publicity by setting a new world
record for "flagpole sitting." The law firm that structured the transaction failed to
prepare an offering memorandum or make the required disclosures in accordance
with the Maryland Securities Act. MD. COM. CODE ANN. § 11-805 (1975). The
attorneys involved refused to pay the $10,000 to $15,000 necessary to comply with
the Act and, as a consequence, the shareholders withdrew from the enterprise.
The jury returned a verdict against the law firm for $170,508.43. Wartzman, 53
Md. App. at 657-61, 456 A.2d at 84-85.
130. In a related area those who oppose the availability of punitive damages in prod-
ucts liability actions have argued that the increased exposure to liability would
bankrupt and "overkill" American industry. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). Contra Owen, supra note 22, at
1324-25; Comment, Punitive Damages Awards in Strict Liability Litigation: The
Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 784-85 (1981) (detailing




B. Problems with the Maryland Approach to Torts Arising out of
Contracts
The standards that have emerged in Maryland for awarding puni-
tive damages in torts arising out of contracts represent an effort to fix
the boundaries of commercial reasonableness by balancing the eco-
nomic justifications for not awarding punitive damages in contract suits
with the societal interest in deterring what is essentially reprehensible
tortious conduct. 3 ' Thus far, courts have identified actual malice as
the appropriate boundary. In light of the well recognized purposes for
awarding punitive damages in general, 132 however, Maryland courts
have made too much of the differences between actual and implied
malice. This distinction is artificial and serves only to obscure the ac-
tual issue. Only rarely can a litigant prove, or even infer, the existence
of evil motive, animosity, ill will, or spite. 33 Reprehensible conduct
thus goes unpunished and undeterred solely because of the difficulty in
proving actual malice.
Another problem with the Maryland approach is that it requires
the existence of an independent tort as a prerequisite to collecting puni-
tive damages in a contractual context.' 34 While there is considerable
authority in support of this proposition, 35 mandating an independent
tort places complex obstacles in the plaintiff's path. It is often difficult
to distinguish a tort arising out of a contract claim from a pure tort
action. Separating the converging areas of law will add a complicated
issue to any trial. 36 Also, it is difficult to conceive of a tortious breach
of an agreement that would not state the elements of at least one in-
dependent tort. Wrongfully retained property would give rise to a
131. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 639, 381 A.2d 16, 23 (1977),
where the court explained:
Recognizing that torts arising out of contractual relationships exhibit
characteristics of both tort and contract actions, we sought in Testerman
to fashion a workable rule governing the recovery of punitive damages
which would be more stringent than that applied in pure ton cases, but
which at the same time would allow the possibility of recovery where the
particular conduct clearly warranted the imposition of such damages.
132. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
135. E.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1982); St. Anne's Home for the Aged v. Daniels, 95 Ill. App. 3d 576, 420 N.E.2d
478 (1981); Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978); R &
H Trucking, Inc. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co., 2 Ohio App. 3d 269, 441
N.E.2d 816 (1981); Smith v. Brown, 283 Pa. Super. 116, 423 A.2d 743 (1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, at 155 comment b (1981).
136. A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1077; Sullivan, supra note 7, at 238-39. But see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355, at 155 comment b (1981) (relying on
liberal pleading rules to overcome the problems associated with distinguishing
torts from contracts). One commentator has characterized the independent tort
requirement as inviting "result oriented judicial manipulation." Sullivan, supra
note 7, at 239.
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claim for conversion,'37 as would a refusal to make a payment. 38 A
promise made by an individual who had no intention of performance
could establish the elements of fraud or misrepresentation. 39 A con-
tract involving the purchase of a defectively manufactured product
would lead to a products liability claim.14 ° Indeed, some authorities
contend that a bad faith breach of contract should be recognized as an
action in tort. 4 '
When even the skilled plaintiffs attorney cannot state all of the
elements of any tort, no action for punitive damages would lie because
of Maryland's outright prohibition of these damages in contract ac-
tions.42 For example, in a case involving a fraudulent breach of con-
tract, a cause of action in tort can only be stated if the fraudulent
statements were made by a defendant who never had any intention of
performing.14 3 If it appears that the representations of future perform-
ance were made with an intent to perform some part of the obligation,
no action in tort will lie.'" In short, the plaintiff who is able to mold
his contract action into an action in tort may recover punitive damages
while the one who cannot is limited to actual damages. This is nothing
more than an emphasis on artful pleading at the expense of the rights
of the parties.
Assuming the existence of malice, it is difficult to understand why
the purposes behind awarding punitive damages are furthered in pure
tort actions but not in tort arising out of contract actions. The conduct
involved is equally reprehensible and the societal interest in deterring
this conduct is equally as pressing. Some authorities contend that tor-
tious conduct is inherently more culpable than breaching a contract
because torts involve conduct that is more distasteful. 145 But if the
breach is accompanied by tortious conduct, assuming once again the
137. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
138. E.g., University Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 369 A.2d 570 (1977) (bank's
wrongful dishonor of a check gave rise to claims in contract and tort); Food Fair
Stores v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975) (employer's refusal to pay pen-
sion benefits); In re Williams, 180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7 (1942) (attorney refused to
turn over client's money).
139. Delmarva Drill Co. v. Tuckahoe, 268 Md. 417, 427, 302 A.2d 37, 41-42 (1973)
(must be a representation of past or existing facts), overruled on other grounds,
Marten Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Tufts v.
Poore, 219 Md. 1, 10-11, 147 A.2d 717, 722-23 (1959) (promise made without a
present intent to perform).
140. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
141. Louderback & Jurika, supra note 120, at 227.
142. See supra note 2.
143. See supra note 94.
144. Council v. Sun Ins. Office, 146 Md. 137, 151, 126 A. 229, 234 (1924) (promise of
future performance is merely an opinion); cf. Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374,
379, 84 A.2d 94, 97 (1951) (failure to fulfill a promise only gives rise to an action
in contract).
145. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 638, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977)
("breaches of contract do not ordinarily engender as much resentment or mental
or physical discomfort as do torts"); A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1077, at 438.
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existence of malice, the distinction between "pure" torts and torts aris-
ing out of contract is meaningless. While malice may be easier to show
in independent tort actions in general, the rarity with which it appears
in tort arising out of contract cases does not mean that malice arising in
a contractual context should not be deterred with equal force.
C A Proposal.- A Un!fied Approach to Punitive Damages-
Redrafting the Rules of Commercial Reasonableness
In place of the complicated theories that have been developed to
accommodate torts arising out of contracts, a new uniform rule must be
developed that focuses on the culpability of a defendant's conduct
rather than on whether that conduct can be classified as a tort or as a
tort arising out of contract.'46 This departure from antiquated prece-
dent represents a logical development because it conditions the availa-
bility of punitive damages on the very reasons that punitive damages
exist: to punish and deter opprobrious conduct.147
Tort arising out of contract actions may further the goals behind
awarding punitive damages, regardless of whether the plaintiff estab-
lishes a separate tort. First, because the limitations placed on contract
damages create an environment where breach is encouraged, both eco-
nomically efficient and socially undesirable breaches are en-
couraged. 48 For example, abuses of disparate bargaining power would
go unpunished and undeterred, as would unscrupulous efforts to cheat
consumers. 49 Second, contract disputes give rise to malicious conduct
that is uniquely appropriate to an award of punitive damages. In con-
trast to the recklessness that permeates many tort actions, 5' allegations
of malice in fraud arising in a contractual context normally involve
willful or deliberate disregard for the rights of others.' 5 ' Although the
actor's state of mind may not rise to the level of express malice, the
146. See Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969) (noting that the
distinction is insignificant).
147. For a discussion of the general purposes for which punitive damages are awarded,
see supra text accompanying notes 19-27.
148. Comment, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8
IND. L. REV. 668, 687 (1975) (although changing society has created new opportu-
nities for oppressive behavior, courts have developed new ways to control this
behavior).
149. See supra note 64.
150. See supra notes 64-66.
151. The Wedeman court recognized this distinction:
Punitive damages are more likely to serve their deterrent purpose in a
fraud case than in most other instances of tortious conduct. One who
acts out of anger or hate in committing an assault, for example, is not apt
to be deterred by a fear of punitive damages. Those who are tempted,
however, to engage deliberately in fraudulent conduct for profit are
more likely to pause and consider the consequences if made aware that
they may be compelled to pay more than the actual loss sustained by the
plaintiff.
Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 531-32, 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976).
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callous disregard for the rights of others is no less reprehensible than
that found in "pure" tort claims.
A Maryland case illustrative of where a uniform standard would
have furthered the deterrent and punitive purposes behind awarding
punitive damages is Aeropesca Ltd v. Butler Aviation International,
Inc. 152 Aeropesca involved an action for breach of contract, coupled
with a claim for fraud, arising out of a breached aircraft maintenance
agreement. The defendant, who had certified a defective airplane as
airworthy, avoided punitive damages because this breach did not
amount to actual malice. Rather, this conduct merely established
"wanton, reckless disregard of the rights of others."' 53
Had the Aeropesca court based its decision on the reasons for
awarding punitive damages, it could have decided the case differently.
Society does indeed have an interest in deterring breaches of contract
that jeopardize human safety. An award of punitive damages would
not only have punished the reckless defendant, but it would have
served as an example to those who knowingly expose others to the
threat of death and serious loss of property. The Aeropesca decision
also illustrates a flaw in the arguments based on the efficient breach
theory. The breach that occurred offers society no economic benefit.
On the contrary, society has a compelling interest in ensuring that simi-
larly situated defendants perform their contractual obligations. Had
the defendant opted to repudiate the contract and seek a more profita-
ble arrangement, no malice would have been established and the econ-
omy, as a whole, would have benefited from the efficient breach. Since
the defendant chose knowingly to conceal that the aircraft was not air-
worthy, the public was recklessly exposed to unreasonable risks. As
this example reveals, efficient breach arguments have no place in situa-
tions involving malice or its legal equivalent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principal justification for imposing punitive damages is to
punish and deter highly undesirable conduct. In Maryland, litigants
may recover punitive damages in cases involving torts arising out of
contracts only after establishing actual malice. Moreover, in a com-
mercial context, actual malice may be inferred. The actual or implied
malice distinction obscures the true issue. For punitive damages to be
152. 44 Md. App. 610, 411 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 287 Md. 749 (1980).
153. The plaintiff, a South American air cargo hauler, entered into a repair contract
with the defendant. The agreement required that the defendant bring the plain-
tiffs newly-purchased aircraft to the level of repair required for a Federal Avia-
tion Administration Export Certificate of Airworthiness. Although the trial court,
sitting as trier of fact, found that the finished product was neither airworthy nor in
compliance with the export certificate requirements, it ruled that the defective per-
formance did not amount to actual malice because the greed and callous disregard
for human life was not motivated by spite or hatred. Id at 627, 411 A.2d at 1065.
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most effective, courts should not hesitate to impose them whenever they
are presented with nefarious conduct of the type that society seeks to
punish and deter.
